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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOHN WELLS, 1 
Plaintiff and Appellant, I 
vs. f Case No. 
CITY COURT OF LOGAN C I T Y , / 13824 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF I 
UTAH, 1 
Defendant and Respondent. J 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent generally agrees with the 
statement of facts contained in Appellant's Brief, but 
in addition thereto submits the following additional 
facts for the Court's information. 
1. That following the arrest of the Defendant by 
the officer, he was taken by the officer to the Cache 
County Law Enforcement Building in Logan, Utah, 
where a breathalizer test was administered to him. 
That following the test the Appellant was released 
following his posting bail with the bail commissioner of 
the Logan City Court at the Law Enforcement 
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Building. That at no time did the Defendant request 
to be brought before a magistrate. 
2. The Respondent denies the statement in 
Appellant's Brief at page 6 that there was a willful 
noncompliance or a total disregard of the law by the 
arresting officer. This question is now moot, as a long 
form complaint was filed in the Logan City Court and 
the Matter was heard on the long form complaint and 
the question presented to the City Judge was whether 
or not the Logan City Court had jurisdiction in this 
matter. R. City Court (2). The City and District Court 
denied Appellant's motion to dismiss, holding the 
Logan City Court had jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOGAN CITY COURT AND THE 
DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE 
LOGAN CITY COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER 
THE APPELLANT WHO WAS CHARGED WITH 
A TRAFFIC OFFENSE OF DRIVING WHILE 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING 
LIQUOR. 
Appellant in his argument under Point One cites 
numerous statutes which he claims vests jurisdiction 
in the Wellsville Town Justice of the Peace. Section 
41-6-166 requires that a person arrested be taken 
before a magistrate . . . "who has jurisdiction of such 
offense and is nearest or most accessible to the place of 
arrest. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Article VIII Section 8 of the Utah Constitution states: 
" . . . The jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace 
shall be as now provided by law, but the 
LEGISLATURE MAY RESTRICT THE 
SAME." 
There are generally two types of Justice of Peace. 
The one is known as the Precinct Justice and the 
other is a Town Justice. In Cache County there are no 
County Precinct Justice of Peace except the Logan 
City Court. The incorporated towns have their own 
Town Justice of Peace where they appointed, and in 
case of Logan City a City Judge is elected. 
The legislature has restricted the jurisdiction of 
Justices of Peace when it amended Section 77-13-17 
U.C.A. in 1971 to read as follows: 
"When an arrest is made without a warrant 
by a peace officer or private person, the 
person arrested must, without unnecessary 
delay be taken to a magistrate in the precinct 
of the County or City in which the offense 
occured . . ." 
The 1971 amendment substituted "be taken to the 
magistrate in the precinct of the county or city in 
which the arrest is made," for "be taken to the nearest 
or most accessible magistrate in the county in which 
the arrest is made". . . . 
Section 41-6-166 contains similar type language 
wherein it states "the arrested person shall be im-
mediately taken before a magistrate. . ." who HAS 
JURISDICTION OF SUCH OFFENSE and is nearest 
or most accessible" to the place of arrest. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In 1971 the legislature also amended Section 77-
57-2 which now reads as follows: 
"Other than as provided by Section 77-13-17, 
proceedings and actions before a 
justices'court for a misdemeanor offense 
must be commenced by complaint under 
oath, setting forth the offense charged, with 
such particulars of time, place, person and 
property as to enable the defendant to un-
derstand distinctly the character of the of-
fense complained of, and to answer the 
complaint. The complaint shall be com-
menced before a magistrate within the 
precinct of the court or city in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed9.' 
It is apparent that the legislature intended that 
jurisdiction of the offense clearly lies with the 
magistrate of the precinct of the county or the city 
where the arrest is made or the offense is committed. 
Appellant admits that the offense and the arrest 
took place outside the territorial limits of the Town 
Justice of Peace of Wellsville, Hyrum and other in-
corporated towns in Cache County. Thus these Town 
Justice of Peace do not have jurisdiction over this 
offense. 
Respondent contends that the requirement in 
section 41-6-166 that requires the arresting officer to 
take the arrested person immediately before a 
magistrate that is nearest or most accessible, WCLS 
repealed by implication, with the enactments of the 
amendments in 1971 by the legislature to similar 
provisions in Section 77-13-17, and also by the adoption 
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of the complaint provision as added to Section 77-57-2 
as above set forth. 
In the case of McCoy vs. Severson 118 Ut. 502, 222 
P. 2d 1058, the Utah Supreme Court held that two or 
more statutes construed will be construed to maintain 
integrity of both where the later is irreconcilable with 
former, the former will be repealed by implication. 
This principle applies to the repeal of inconsistent 
provisions of Section 41-6-166. 
Judge Christoffersen is his memorandum decision 
in refering to the amendment of Section 77-57-2 
correctly states the following: 
"This addition, this Court held, confines the 
geographical jurisdiction of the Precinct 
Justice of the Peace to the boundaries of his 
precinct and the Town or City Justice of the 
Peace to the geographical boundary limits of 
the city or town. Such enactment, it is the 
opinion of this Court, was enacted by the 
legislature to eliminate the past practice of 
arresting a person in one part of the county 
and taking him to another part of the county 
and shopping for a Justice of the Peace who is 
more amenable to their case." 
At the time that the legislature was considering 
the amendments there was great public concern about 
the practice of certain highway patrolmen and other 
law enforcement personnel particularly in Salt Lake 
County in taking arrested drivers before certain 
Justices of Peace who would almost invariably find in 
favor of the police officer. This practice was most 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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offenseive to our sense, of fairness, and the legislature 
attempted to correct this abuse by the enactment of 
the amendments to the two statutes above set forth. 
The legislature in 1971 enacted a new Section 78-
4-16.5 U.C.A. that gives county wide jurisdiction to 
the City Court where they have been established. 
This statute reads as follows: 
"Whenever a complaint may be commenced 
before a magistrate under Section 77-57-2 or 
an arrested person is to be taken before a 
magistrate under Section 77-13-17, the 
complaint may be commenced or the arrested 
person may be taken before the nearest City 
Court Judge in counties where City Courts 
have been established." 
Judge Christoffersen in his memorandum decision 
after much consideration correctly reconciled these 
amendments and enactments when he held: 
"The Court, therefore, denies the writ on the 
following two grounds: First, that the offense 
occurred outside the boundaries of any city 
or town justice; that the precinct justice of 
the peace was in fact the Logan City Judge; 
and the second ground is that under 78-4-16.5 
IN ANY EVENT THE COMPLAINT MAY 
BE COMMENCED OR THE ARRESTED 
PERSON TAKEN TO THE NEAREST 
CITY COURT JUDGE, WHICH IS IN THIS 
CASE THE LOGAN CITY COURT, for any 
offense that is a misdemeanor that occurs in 
Cache County under State Law and need not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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be taken to nearest justice of the peace under 
authority of that newly enacted statute." 
The Appellants in their brief as part of 
the statement of facts admit that the ticket issued by 
the patrolman was not a valid promise to appear, and 
when the Appellant was formally charged with a 
complaint in the Logan City Court, the City Court and 
District Judge properly ruled that it did have 
jurisdiction over the offense charged. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
HOLDING THAT THE GEOGRAPHICAL 
JURISDICTION OF THE TOWN JUSTICES IS 
CONFINED TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUN-
DARY LIMITS OF THE TOWN, AND THAT THE 
CITY COURT OF LOGAN CITY IS THE EX-
OFFICIO JUSTICE OF THE PEACE FOR THE 
COUNTY. 
The record in this case is replete with references 
to the word Justice of the Peace and Justices Courts. 
The Plaintiff has made no distinction between the two 
types of Justice Courts. The first is the Precinct 
Justice and the second is the Town Justice. Cache 
County has only one precinct and that is the entire 
County and the Precinct Justice Court is the Logan 
City Court. The various towns have Justice Courts, 
but they are estabKshed by the town itself and have no 
jurisdiction outside the corporate limits of the town. 
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Section 78-5-5 sets forth the jurisdiction of 
the City and Town Justices as it relates to the nature 
of the offense. However, it does not define the 
geographical limits of jurisdiction of the Courts. This 
Court in Leatham vs. Reger, 54 Utah 491,182 Pac. 187, 
recognized the difference between the Precinct 
Justice and the town Justice in respect to their 
geographical jurisdiction. 
The compiled laws of 1876 at page 729, Section 13, 
with regard to the City of Wellsville, states as follows: 
uThe Justices of the Peace shall be con-
servators of the peace within the limits of the 
city and shall give bonds and qualify as other 
Justices of the Peace and when so qualified 
shall possess the same powers and 
jurisdiction, both in civil and criminal cases, 
arising under the laws of the territory and 
may be commissioned as Justice of the Peace 
in and for said city by the Governor." 
A similar statement relating to Hyrum City is sta-
ted in Section 3 as follows: 
"There shall also be elected in a like manner 
two Justices of the Peace, who shall have the 
qualifications of voters, be commissioned by 
the Govenor, and have jurisdiction in all 
cases arising under the ordinances of the 
city." 
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution 
heretofore cited states that the jurisdiction of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Justices of the Peace shall be as now provided by law, 
but the legislature may restrict the same, indicating 
that the legislature may not confer greater 
jurisdiction upon the Justices of Peace, but may limit 
their jurisdiction as it existed in 1876. It is the State's 
position that a Town Justice of the Peace can have no 
greater jurisdiction than the corporate limits of the 
city or town. 
See Dillard vs. District Court of Salt Lake 
County, 69 Utah 10,251 Pac. 1070, where this Court 
cited what is now known as Section 78-5-4, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, and stated as follows: 
"After the enactment of the foregoing sec-
tion, the legislature created City Courts in 
certain cities of the State, invested them with 
a larger civil jurisdiction than Justices 
Courts and in respect of their criminal 
jurisdiction provided that a City Court shall 
have exclusive original jurisdiction of all 
cases arising under or by reason of the 
violation of any of the ordinances of the city, 
which such Court is held and shall have the 
same powers and jurisdiction in all other 
criminal actions as are or may be prescribed 
for Justices of the Peace." 
This Section refers to a Precinct Justice of the 
Peace under Section 78-5-4 and not a City Justice of 
the Peace under 78-5-5; and therefore, vests in the 
City Court, County wide jurisdiction. The reason 
being, that the territorial jurisdiction of Justices 
Courts in criminal cases was limited to public offenses 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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committed within their respective precincts or cities. 
This rational is further reinforced by Section 78-5-1, 
quoted in the Plaintiffs Brief, which states that every 
Justice of the Peace shall reside in and shall hold a 
Justice's Court in the precinct, city or town for which 
he is elected or appointed and Section 78-4-16.5, 
relating to the filing of a Complaint in the City Court. 
Defendant argues that arrest under Sections 41-6-
166 and 41-6-167, occurring under the Motor Vehicle 
Code are distinctive from other misdemeanor arrests; 
and, therefore, the Section 78-4-16.5 does not apply. A 
reading of Section 41-6-166 states that whenever any 
person is arrested for a violation of the Motor Vehicle 
Act, the arrested person shall be immediately taken 
before a magistrate within the County in and which 
the offense charge is alleged to have been committed 
and who has jurisdiction of such offense. 
From the statutes heretofore cited, it is apparent 
that a Town Justice does not have jurisdiction of an 
offense occuring outside of his municipal corporate 
limits regardless of whether or not he is the nearest or 
most accessible magistrate. 
The Logan City Court receives its County wide 
jurisdiction by reason of Section 78-446 where 
the Court was granted the same powers of jurisdiction 
in all other criminal actions as are or may be 
prescribed for Precinct Justices of the Peace under 78-
5-4. This act could not have related to Town 
Justices (78-5-5) as the City Court already had 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the jurisdiction under 78-4-16; and therefore, this 
grant of jurisdiction had to refer to Precinct Justices 
to have any meaning and continuity, and, therefore, 
county wide jurisdiction. 
The Counsel for the Plaintiff unnecessarily 
complicates his arguments when, in fact, the Motor 
Vehicle Code itself requires that the magistrate be 
within the county in which the offense is charged and 
has jurisdiction over such offense and is the nearest or 
most accessible. 
The Plaintiff cites the case of State ex rel. Town 
of Garland vs. Maughan, 35 U. 426, 100 Pac. 934, for 
the proposition that City Justices of the Peace in 
criminal cases have jurisdiction over the entire 
county. A reading of the case will note that the case 
was commenced in the Justice Court of Box Elder 
County Precinct, Box Elder County, Utah. The Town 
of Garland was situated within the precinct of Sunset 
and not the precinct of Box Elder. The question then 
was whether or not a Precinct Justice Court had 
jurisdiction over a city ordinance where the city was 
located within another precinct. The paragraph cited 
in Plaintiffs Brief on page 20 is taken out of context in 
that the Plaintiffs counsel was talking about Precinct 
Justices and not City Justices. Therefore, the Court's 
statement that Precinct Justices have county wide 
jurisdiction was, in fact, at that time a correct 
statement. A more appropriate citation from that case 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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is found on page 936 where the Court says: 
"We think the legislature intended just what 
the language imports, namely that all of-
fenses against town ordinances must be tried 
the Justice of the Peace for the precinct in 
which the town is situated." 
Citing from page 937: 
"It needs neither further argument nor 
authority to prove that a Judge cannot, 
without express authority of law, hold Court 
outside of the terrirtory for which he is 
elected." 
This case stands for the proposition that the 
Precinct Justices had territorial jurisdiction of the 
precinct and when trying cases involving violation of 
city ordinances had the further obligation to hold 
Court within the town where the offense was alleged 
to have occurred and this reasoning can be applied to 
the case before the Court to the effect that a Town 
Justice of Wellsville cannot, therefore, have territorial 
jurisdiction outside of the municipal corporate limits of 
Wellsville. Although, he may have jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, he does not have territorial 
jurisdiction and both are essential elements of any 
Court's jurisdiction. 
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CONCLUSION 
Throughout this entire proceeding, arguments 
propounded by the Plaintiff have steadfastly refused 
to accept the concept of geographic or territorial 
jurisdiction of a Court. 
Many cases cited by both the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant in this Brief have held that jurisdiction is a 
two-fold requirement; that being jurisdiction over the 
subject matter to be tried and territorial jurisdiction 
over the place of the alleged commission of the offense. 
Ignoring the requirement of territorial 
jurisdiction gives rise to the confusion in the Plaintiffs 
Brief relating to the various sections of the statute and 
leaves the Plaintiffs Brief fraught with difficulties in 
reconciling the various statutes. However, excepting 
as we must, the concept of territorial jurisdiction as it 
relates to the Justice Courts, reconciliation between 
the various statutes becomes less confusing and 
results in an orderly means of administration of the 
criminal laws. 
The Plaintiff has advanced a novel theory in his 
Brief by claiming the Wellsville Justice Court to have 
county wide jurisdiction, in that the people of a portion 
of the County could appoint or elect a Justice of the 
Peace who would have jurisdiction over geographical 
areas outside of the municipality which elected or 
appointed the Justice of the Peace; such, however, is 
the case of City Courts, but the legislature expressly 
made this provision in Section 78-4-16. In this case the 
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Plaintiff was administered a breath test as provided in 
Section 41-6-44.10, which states that any person 
operating a motor vehicle in this State shall be deemed 
to have given his consent to a chemical test of his 
breath for the purpose of determining alcoholic 
content. This test was administered as soon after the 
offense as possible in order to preserve it's validity, 
This section then must be construed as a later 
pronouncement of the legislature and must serve to 
modify Section 41-6-166, where it is stated that a 
person arrested for violation of this act shall be im-
mediately taken before a magistrate within the county 
in which the offense charged is alleged to have been 
committed. The Logan City Court at all times was, in 
fact, the only Precinct Justice Court in Cache County; 
and, therefore, had jurisdiction by virtue of the 
arguments contained in the points in this Brief. 
In view of the facts and the law cited herein, the 
Defendants pray that the Supreme Court deny the 
writ of prohibition sought by the Plaintiff in this 
matter. 
Date this 9 day of December, 1974. 
Respectfully submitted, 
B. H. HARRIS 
Cache County Attorney 
GEORGE W. PRESTON 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
